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It is widely acknowledged today that the rise of new powers in the global economy has failed to produce 
commensurate adjustments in the architecture of global economic governance. How, then, do established 
multilaterals navigate the challenges arising from growing multipolarity? The article tackles this question 
by examining recent IMF and World Bank practice. It argues that, resistant though the Bretton Woods 
twins are to comprehensive reform, they nonetheless employ mechanisms to cope with the new realities on 
the ground. However, this adaptation lacks a cohesive strategy, and on balance remains insufficient. The 
analysis launches from a discussion of the normative, operational and competitive challenges the 
organizations face. It then discusses three coping mechanisms the Fund and Bank have employed over the 
past decade: (1) bolstering operations in low-income countries (LICs) and small middle-income countries 
(MICs); (2) adopting a flexible approach towards large MICs to retain them in the organizations’ client 
portfolio; and (3) reinforcing and refining non-lending activity to preserve normative authority. The 
effectiveness of these adaptive efforts in addressing the challenges of multipolarity is variable, comprising 
a mix of modest gain, abject failure, and untested promise. Implications for the organizations’ efficacy also 
remain uncertain. Even then, these initiatives highlight the twins’ willingness to defend their institutional 
supremacy in a fast-changing global system. Crucially, they also harbour important signs of change in how 
‘development’ is perceived and practised in the strongholds of Western multilateralism. 
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It is widely acknowledged today that the rise of new powers in the global economy 
has failed to produce commensurate adjustments in the architecture of global economic 
governance. With operational objectives that typically reflect policy norms originating in the 
Anglo-American core, and decision–making structures that remain favourable to Northern 
shareholders despite recent quota changes,1 the IMF and the World Bank represent a crucial 
dimension of the problem. Yet scholars are divided in their prognoses of what awaits the 
Bretton Woods twins in an increasingly multipolar world. Some have suggested that, given 
the slow pace and limited scope of the adjustments to their practice and governance, these 
major international financial institutions (IFIs) may struggle to preserve their financial and 
normative relevance.2 Others contend that structural dependencies on the part of emerging 
economies and the lack of effective alternatives to the existing architecture will shield core 
organizations of Western multilateralism such as the Fund and Bank from obsolescence.3
                                                 
* Earlier versions of this article were presented at the British International Studies Association (BISA) Annual 
Conference, Edinburgh, 15–17 June 2016, and at the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (SPERI) 
Conference 2016, Sheffield, 2–4 July 2016. The author wishes to thank Mathias Kranke, Deborah Mabbett, 
David Styan, and three anonymous reviewers of the journal for valuable comments. 
    
1 Jakob Vestergaard and Robert H. Wade, ‘Still in the woods? Gridlock in the IMF and the World Bank puts 
multilateralism at risk’, Global Policy 6:1, 2015, 1–12.  
2 Ngaire Woods, ‘Global governance after the financial crisis: a new multilateralism or the last gasp of great 
powers?’, Global Policy 1: 1,  2010, pp. 51–63; Robert H. Wade, ‘Emerging world order? From multipolarity to 
multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF’, Politics and Society 39: 3, 2011, pp. 347–78.  
3 G. John Ikenberry, ‘The future of multilateralism: governing the world in a post-hegemonic era’, Japanese 
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Building on an analysis of recent Fund and Bank practice, this article paints an 
alternative picture that contributes to both sides of the debate. On the one hand, it finds that, 
resistant though the twins are to comprehensive reform, they nonetheless employ mechanisms 
to navigate the new realities on the ground. Some of these mechanisms are purposely 
designed to counter fresh challenges in a fast-changing international landscape; they involve 
varying degrees of innovation. Others reflect continuation or mere extension of existing 
practice, and operate in the background to reinforce the organizations’ prominence in the 
global political economy. As such, the Fund and Bank have greater adaptive potential in the 
face of growing multipolarity than their critics often suggest. On the other hand, the findings 
warn against over-optimism about the twins’ adaptive efficiency. While some coping 
mechanisms yield results, the viability of others is uncertain, and there are instances of abject 
failure as well. More crucially, most new measures are neither bold enough given the 
magnitude of the tectonic shifts in the world economy, nor do they seem to unambiguously 
enhance organizational efficacy. The verdict, in brief, is that an ad hoc adaptation is taking 
place, but in the absence of a cohesive strategy it remains unfocused and insufficient.   
The challenge of emerging powers for the Bretton Woods twins is profound, as 
explored in the next section. The rise of Brazil, China, India and others questions the 
normative authority of these Washington-based institutions, defying development visions 
rooted in policy orthodoxy and illustrating the viability of multiple paths to growth. This 
normative challenge is compounded by an operational one, as emerging economies typically 
evade conditionality-based IMF loans while tapping World Bank resources selectively. 
Finally, rising powers exert direct competitive pressures upon North-led IFIs via intensified 
South-South cooperation and, more recently, by spearheading rival institutions such as the 
New Development Bank (NDB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).         
The coping mechanisms identified here do not tightly overlap with these challenges—
which in part accounts for their limited effectiveness. They also occupy a wide spectrum, 
from careful adjustment at one end to reliance on existing practice at the other. Classified 
according to their broad aims, they fall under three categories: (1) preservation and, where 
possible, expansion of operations in low-income countries (LICs) and smaller middle-income 
countries (MICs); (2) a flexible approach towards large MICs to retain them in the 
organizations’ client portfolio; and (3) reinforcement and refinement of existing non-lending 
activities to preserve normative authority, bilaterally as well as globally (mainly research, 
inter-organizational coordination, and provision of expertise). The initiatives discussed under 
these categories are too varied for a mono-causal explanation. For most changes in lending 
framework and patterns, however, pragmatic, internally-driven responses to novel dynamics 
in the twins’ operational environment offer good explanatory promise. Theoretically, 
therefore, the analysis highlights the potential of combining constructivist insights with recent 
emphases on structural environmental factors shaping IFI practice. By comparison, 
preferences of Northern shareholders and normative proclivities of staff, while deservedly 
given ample consideration in IFI scholarship, prove only occasionally relevant.  
The literature on rising powers has so far focused chiefly on country strategies,4 with 
scant attention placed on how established multilaterals respond to contemporary power 
shifts.5
                                                                                                                                                        
Journal of Political Science 16: 3, 2015, pp. 399–413; Matthew D. Stephen, ‘Rising powers, global capitalism 
and liberal global governance: a historical materialist account of the BRICS challenge’, European Journal of 
International Relations 20: 4, 2014, pp. 912–38.  
 In engaging this underexplored theme, the paper makes two contributions. The first is 
4 See, for example, the May 2013 special issue of International Affairs on rising power negotiating strategies. 
5 Scholarship on how Northern multilaterals respond to growing multipolarity remains thin. See Bernhard Zangl, 
Frederick Heußner, Andreas Kruck and Xenia Lanzendörfer, ‘Imperfect adaptation: how the WTO and the IMF 
adjust to shifting power distributions among their members’, Review of International Organizations 11: 2, 2016, 
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the core analytical finding that, despite their resistance to major reform, the Fund and Bank 
strive to defend their institutionalized supremacy in a dynamic international system through 
continuous internal adaptation. On balance, however, this adaptation remains partial and 
insufficient. Second, these adaptive efforts also harbour signs of change in how development 
is perceived and practised in the strongholds of Western multilateralism. New measures are 
variegated in design, but they invariably involve a shift away from the twins’ conventional 
prescriptive eagerness and normative certitude, and towards operational pragmatism sensitive 
to diverse borrower preferences. These points are elaborated in the concluding section. But 
let us first examine the challenges the IFIs face in an increasingly multipolar world economy. 
 
 
Normative, Operational, Competitive Challenges 
 
 The IMF and the World Bank are products of a previous era of shift in the global 
power balance; they embodied the postwar strategic preference of the US for formal 
platforms of international economic coordination. Yet in their early decades neither 
organization enjoyed a favourable context to flourish. American economic supremacy was 
too hands-on (the Marshall Plan, the dollar–gold standard) and the few emergencies that 
erupted were not sufficiently systemic to warrant a central role for the organizations. Thus 
followed the striking irony in their history: underlying the dramatic increase in the visibility 
of the Bretton Woods twins was none other than the disintegration of the Bretton Woods 
order of fixed exchange rates and financial controls in the 1970s, ushering in a more 
complex, perilous world economy in which multilateral coordination increasingly mattered. 
 The twins’ expanded role rested on a radical change in clientele. Despite significant 
differences between the two organizations in mandate, size and bureaucratic culture, for both 
the target of coordination distinctly shifted towards policy and institutions in the Third 
World. Having already established a foothold in several large developing nations, the Bank 
from the 1960s on expanded its operations to newly decolonised regions, and by the 1970s its 
focus went beyond infrastructure projects to encompass a broad agenda, including public 
sector reforms and human development. As the turbulent 1970s gave way to debt crises, the 
Fund also began extending loans with structural conditions. How IFI programmes in the 
1980s and 1990s advocated interlinked neoliberal–globalist reform agendas with problematic 
consequences has been analysed extensively.6 Yet despite intense criticism, by the turn of the 
century the two multilaterals came to represent the hallmark of Western efforts to foster 
‘development.’ Not only were they the leading source of official financing in the South, but 
their expansive operations and overgrown research departments accorded them unparalleled 
normative authority and epistemic influence over the goals and instruments of development.7
 Against this background, emerging countries challenge the Fund and Bank at three 
potentially interacting levels: normative, operational, and competitive. One danger is the 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
pp. 171–96; Miles Kahler, ‘The global economic multilaterals: will eighty years be enough?’, Global 
Governance 22: 1, 2016, pp. 1–9; Ali Burak Güven, ‘The World Bank and emerging powers: beyond the 
multipolarity-multilateralism conundrum’, New Political Economy (forthcoming).   
6 Ngaire Woods, The globalizers: the IMF, the World Bank, and their borrowers (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2006); Richard Peet, Unholy trinity: the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, second edition 
(London: Zed, 2009). Despite their common origin and analogous governance structures, the two organizations 
display marked differences and compete for resources, and even portrayed as ‘rival siblings’; Bessma Momani 
and Mark Hibben, ‘Cooperation or clashes on 19th Street? Theorizing and assessing IMF and World Bank 
collaboration’, Journal of International Organization Studies 6: 2, 2015, pp. 27–43.      
7 Susan Park and Antje Vetterlein, eds, Owning development: creating policy norms in the IMF and the World 
Bank (Cambridge: CUP, 2010).  See also Michael Zürn, Michael Bender and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, 
‘International authority and its politicization’, International Theory 4: 1, 2012, pp. 69–106, on how the authority 
of international institutions correlates with increased politicization—a point of significant relevance for the IFIs.  
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negation of the normative leadership of the IFIs. The issue is not a categorical rejection of 
mainstream development policy, but the increasingly obvious futility of quests for best 
practice. Asian high performers, from Japan and South Korea to China, have typically 
ascribed the state a more central role in economic policy than often considered appropriate by 
the IFIs.8 Brazil’s now increasingly questioned neo–developmentalist path similarly diverged 
from the neoliberal orthodoxy.9
 Emerging countries have also been reluctant to adopt the official upgrade of orthodox 
IFI prescriptions. From the 1990s onwards, the IFIs have advocated a social and regulatory 
neoliberalism, with a focus on good governance and social inclusion—a paradigm broadening 
known as the post-Washington Consensus (PWC).
 Yet others, such as India, adopted a market–liberal stance, 
with mixed results. Development strategies across a wide spectrum have managed to strike an 
acceptable balance between political and economic feasibility.         
10 Yet the uptake of this agenda has been 
uneven. Social programmes proved popular in some regions (Latin America), and some large 
MICs such as Indonesia and Turkey implemented comprehensive reforms.11
 In fact, recent economic fortunes of many rising powers appear to have been shaped 
as much by a confluence of external circumstances as domestic forces. The half-decade 
before the 2008–09 crisis represented the most development–friendly juncture in the world 
economy since the 1960s. High commodity prices and record increases in trade and financial 
flows pushed growth rates across the South above an annual average of 7 percent in 2001–07. 
After the crisis, loose monetary policy in the US and EU led to a rush of funds to Southern 
markets, often masking severe domestic imbalances. Likewise, many countries suffered sharp 
slowdowns in 2013–16 due in part to expectations of monetary tightening in the North and 
Chinese efforts at rebalancing, with commodity exporters hit particularly hard.
 However, the 
persistent prevalence of graft and deficiencies of democratic accountability indicate that in 
many countries the PWC emphasis on good governance and institutions is hardly a priority.  
12
 Second, on the operational front, the challenge is potential evasion of Fund-Bank 
lending. Today’s rising economies have conventionally been the largest clients of the IFIs. 
Shifts in their borrowing patterns affect the twins’ bottom line profoundly, in particular given 
MIC loans are extended at near–market rates. The Bank’s all-time top borrowers include 
India, Brazil, China, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey and Argentina, all clients of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the organizations’ nonconcessional arm. 
Until recently a likewise small group of MICs accounted for most of the Fund’s portfolio. 
 The point is 
that it is increasingly difficult to identify a rigid correlation between domestic policy sets and 
economic performance in large MICs. This is not to say domestic policies or institutions do 
not matter but, from the short-term perspective of a typical electoral cycle, it weakens the 
political appeal of following the conservative, self-serving advice of Northern multilaterals 
that insist on universalizing prescriptive visions often insensitive to nondomestic variables.   
                                                 
8 Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed., The developmental state (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); 
Christopher A. McNally, ‘Sino-capitalism: China’s reemergence and the international political economy’, World 
Politics 64: 4, 2012, pp. 741–76.  
9 Cornel Ban, ‘Brazil’s liberal neo-developmentalism: new paradigm or edited orthodoxy?’, Review of 
International Political Economy 20: 2, 2013, pp. 298–331.  
10 Ziya Öniş and Fikret Şenses, ‘Re-thinking the emerging post-Washington consensus’, Development and 
Change 36: 2, 2005, pp. 263–90; Dani Rodrik, ‘Goodbye Washington consensus, hello Washington confusion? 
A review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform’, Journal of 
Economic Literature 44: 4, 2006, pp. 973–87. 
11 Toby Carroll, Delusions of development: The World Bank and the post-Washington consensus in Southeast 
Asia (New York: Palgrave, 2010); Ali Burak Güven, ‘The feasibility of IFI-led institutional reform: four Turkish 
experiments compared’, Development Policy Review 30: 4, 2012, pp. 425–49.  
12 Recent reports are more upbeat; see ‘Are emerging markets entering a new virtuous cycle?’, Financial Times, 
28 Feb 2017.   
5 
 
Maintaining an active lender-borrower relationship with systemically important economies 
also reinforce the IFIs’ relevancy in the global economy. Weakening of this operational 
relationship would undermine both the financial and the policy viability of the twins. 
 There are good reasons for countries to resist IFI loans. The literature is replete with 
critical findings, from how lending decisions and conditionality reflect preferences of the 
organizations’ Northern membership13 to the often adverse macroeconomic outcomes of IFI 
programmes.14 Still, loans to emerging economies represent an area in which the experiences 
of the twins have diverged considerably. For the Fund, the sharp drop in demand for loans 
from 2003 onwards caused an existential threat, triggering a staff layoff in 2007. And while 
large programmes in the eurozone (Greece, Ireland, Portugal), the wider European area 
(Ukraine) and a few developing members (Pakistan, Iraq) led to a remarkable increase in its 
portfolio after the crisis, most emerging economies have explicitly avoided Fund lending.15
  The crisis proved to be a blessing for the Bank as well. However, unlike the Fund, 
emerging countries continued to borrow heavily from the Bank, with India and Brazil 
remaining the biggest clients, and several MICs maintaining massive portfolios. Even then, 
the composition of Bank loans to large MICs has shifted in recent years, and there are signs 
of a decline in the volume of large MIC lending. Thus, while the Bank’s prospects in 
emerging countries are nowhere as bleak as the Fund’s, here too are tensions building.  
  
   Third, in terms of competitive pressures, the danger is substitution. Intensified 
South-South cooperation over the past two decades is one crucial dynamic. Southern donors 
such as China and Brazil transform the landscape of development assistance by emphasizing 
horizontal relationships and avoiding intrusive conditions.16 They thus expand possibilities 
for development finance, ushering in an ‘age of choice’17 for LICs and smaller MICs and 
putting pressure upon conventional lenders such as the Bank.18 The normative and 
operational impact of this dynamic on the international development regime is significant.19
A more direct challenge is the creation of alternative organizations and mechanisms to 
substitute current functions of Western multilaterals. Early work argued that rising countries 
were unlikely to openly contest existing multilateral bodies; instead they would subscribe to a 
‘game of institutionalised hierarchy.’
 
20
                                                 
13 Mark Copelovitch, ‘Master or servant? Common agency and the political economy of IMF lending’, 
International Studies Quarterly 54, 2010, pp. 49–77; Christopher Kilby, ‘The political economy of 
conditionality: an empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements’, Journal of Development Economics 
89, 2009, pp. 51–61; Randall Stone, ‘The scope of IMF conditionality’, International Organization 62, 2008, 
pp. 589–620. 
 Subsequent research also suggested that countries’ 
14 William Easterly, ‘What did structural adjustment adjust? The association of policies and growth with 
repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment loans’, Journal of Development Economics 76:1, 2005, 1–22;  James 
Vreeland, The IMF and economic development (Cambridge: CUP, 2003). Recent research is more nuanced; see 
Michael Binder and Marcel Bluhm, ‘On the conditional effects of IMF program participation on output growth’, 
Journal of Macroeconomics 51, 2017, pp. 192–214, and Lodewijk Smets and Stephen Knack, ‘World Bank 
lending and the quality of economic policy’, Journal of Development Studies 52: 1, 2016, pp. 72–91.  
15 The minor exception is the new Flexible Credit Line (FCL), as discussed in the next section. 
16 Emma Mawdsley, From recipients to donors: the emerging powers and the changing development landscape 
(London: Zed, 2012); Fahim Quadir, ‘Rising donors and the new narrative of “South-South” cooperation: what 
prospects for changing the landscape of development assistance programmes?’ Third World Quarterly 34: 2, 
2013, pp. 321–38.   
17 Annalisa Prizzon, Romilly Greenhill, and Shakira Mustapha, An age of choice for development finance: 
evidence from country case studies (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2016).  
18 Dominik Kopiński and Qian Sun, ‘New friends, old friends? The World Bank and Africa when the Chinese 
are coming’, Global Governance 20: 4, 2014, pp. 601–23.  
19 Emma Mawdsley, ‘Development geography 1: cooperation, competition, and convergence between “North” 
and “South”’, Progress in Human Geography 41: 1, 2017, pp. 108–17.  
20 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers?’, 
International Affairs 82: 1, 2006, pp. 1–19.  
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structural dependence on the existing architecture21 along with opportunities for contestation 
from within22
Yet emerging countries are lately moving in this exact direction. One example is the 
prevalence of reserve accumulation as insurance, which proved instrumental in avoiding IMF 
loans during the crisis.
 would discourage forging rival agencies and devising alternative practices. 
23 A more crucial case includes the founding of new lenders such as 
the AIIB, with China in the driver’s seat, and the NDB, spearheaded by BRICS. Officially, 
the AIIB and NDB are responses to unmet infrastructure financing needs in the South. They 
are designed to complement, not supplant, existing lenders, with a side function of serving as 
‘outside options’ to augment the bargaining power of rising economies in established 
multilaterals.24 Yet as large lenders they pose a distinct threat to the World Bank, which only 
recently updated its infrastructure strategy.25 The rapid development especially of the AIIB 
suggests that, given time and Chinese willingness, these constructs might evolve into feasible 
substitutes,26
These challenges (normative negation, operational evasion, and competitive 
substitution) should not be construed as systematized, coordinated efforts to undermine the 
IMF and the World Bank. Collectively, though, they capture the scale and the complexity of 
the problems the organizations face as a result of the ongoing global power shifts. 
 incentivizing avoidance of loans in an instance of possible mutual 
reinforcement of the challenges discussed.  
 
   
Coping mechanisms 
 
 How can the IMF and the World Bank address these challenges? The answer would 
vary according to the goal of adaptation, especially considering that in neither organization’s 
history did international prominence ensure effective fulfilment of mandate. Yet assuming 
that there is, however tenuous, a correlation between salience and effectiveness, the following 
would constitute potentially meaningful avenues of action for the IFIs today: Addressing 
normative challenges would require greater attention to the diversity of developmental 
pathways and closer alignment of expertise with demand from member states. The alleviation 
of operational challenges would entail restructuring lending practice to give more voice to 
borrowers and reduce the conventional emphasis on conditionality. Competitive challenges 
are perhaps most difficult to directly meet as they are yet unfolding, but here too adjusting 
organizational practice to evolving member needs and demand should receive priority, with 
an additional view to leading initiatives for inter-organizational cooperation and coordination. 
 Evaluated against the above, the twins’ adaptive efforts are wide-ranging, yet far from 
sufficient. Just as the challenges to the Fund and Bank from rising countries are systemic but 
not systematized, so too are the way the organizations meet these challenges often 
spontaneous and intertwined with other initiatives rather than purposeful and strategic. 
Consequently the challenges and the coping mechanisms only partially overlap. To date the 
main course of action has been to accommodate the perceived shifts in the preferences of 
                                                 
21 Stephen, ‘Rising powers, global capitalism and liberal global governance’.  
22 Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Contested multilateralism’, Review of International Organizations 9: 
4, 2014, 385–412.  
23 Graham Bird and Alex Mandilaras, ‘Once bitten: the effect of IMF programmes on subsequent reserve 
behaviour’, Review of Development Economics 15: 2, 2011, pp. 264–278.  
24 Kahler, ‘The global economic multilaterals’, pp 5–6.  See also Jiajin Xu, Beyond US hegemony in 
international development: the contest for influence at the World Bank (Cambridge: CUP, 2016), which traces 
the origins of the AIIB and NDB to Chinese frustrations about US’ disproportionate influence at the Bank.    
25 World Bank, Transformation through infrastructure: World Bank Group infrastructure strategy update 
FY2012–2015 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012).  
26 As of July 2017, most AIIB projects are co-financed with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or the World 
Bank. Yet there are several AIIB–only projects in the pipeline, indicating potential for an independent role.    
7 
 
borrowers via continuous modifications to lending framework and by adopting increasingly 
flexible lending patterns. Devoid of a distinctive normative content beyond a general sense of 
paradigmatic relaxation, this is an ultimately reactive, indirect approach, and does not amount 
to a comprehensive strategy. In turn its contribution to overall organizational efficacy is 
vague, whereas the viability of individual initiatives varies greatly.     
Before outlining these initiatives, let us broadly locate their immediate drivers within 
the specialist literature on the Fund and Bank. The influence of powerful member states has 
figured prominently in studies of IFI behaviour.27 Yet few changes discussed below can be 
traced straight back to the preferences of the twins’ Northern shareholders. Nor could these 
changes be readily associated with any clear direction in development paradigm, another 
widely invoked theme.28
The main driver behind the IFIs’ adaptive efforts appears to be their dynamic 
organizational imperatives in a changing operational environment. Over the years both 
agencies have displayed varying degrees of autonomy embedded in distinct bureaucratic 
cultures and operating procedures, as documented in constructivist scholarship.
 If anything, the sort of flexibility that characterizes recent Fund and 
Bank practice is indicative of a preference for pragmatism over ideational rigidity,. 
29 This 
relative autonomy is now employed to align the twins’ operative framework and lending 
patterns with evolving client preferences and capabilities — provided such alignment does 
not openly contravene shareholder interests. As such, the findings follow an emergent 
scholarly interest in the role of structural environmental changes in shaping IFI practice.30
 
 
 
Preserve and expand: refocusing on the ‘conventional South’ 
 
 The IFIs’ most obvious adaptive mechanism is to preserve and, where possible, 
expand their operations. This is best manifested in their attitude towards concessional lending 
and loans to smaller members that comprise their portfolio in the ‘conventional South.’  
The IMF is still the world’s unrivalled lender of last resort, as proven in the vital role 
it played during the eurozone crisis. Relatively little attention has been paid, however, to the 
resurgence of loans elsewhere. In actuality, the majority of Fund arrangements since the 
global crisis has targeted the developing world, with more than 40 facilities extended to sub-
Saharan Africa alone. While these programmes are typically much smaller in size than loans 
to Europe (Greece, Hungary, Portugal) and the European periphery (Ukraine in particular), 
their pervasiveness represents a new era of intense IMF presence in developing areas. Fund 
clients in the post-crisis period include many regionally important economies in the global 
                                                 
27 Some such accounts are inspired by principal-agent theory, but the emphasis on powerful members is not the 
prerogative of a single analytic persuasion. For a range of examples, see Bessma Momani, ‘The American 
politicization of the International Monetary Fund’, Review of International Political Economy 11: 5, 2004, 880–
914; Christopher Kilby, ‘An empirical assessment of informal influence at the World Bank’, Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 61: 2, 2013, pp. 431–64; Daniel L. Nielson and Michale J. Tierney, 
‘Delegation to international organizations: agency theory and World Bank environmental reform’, International 
Organization 57:2, 2003, 241–76; Randall W. Stone, Controlling institutions: international organizations and 
the global economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
28 See, among numerous others, Sarah Babb, ‘The Washington Consensus as transnational policy paradigm: its 
origins, trajectory and likely successor’, Review of International Political Economy 20: 2, 2012, 268–97; Park 
and Vetterlein, Owning development; Rodrik, ‘Goodbye Washington consensus, hello Washington confusion?’   
29 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the world: international organizations in global politics 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), chapter 3; Catherine Weaver, The hypocrisy trap: the World Bank and 
the poverty of reform (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).   
30 Phillip Y. Lipscy, ‘Explaining institutional change: policy areas, outside options, and the Bretton Woods 
institutions’, American Journal of Political Science 59: 2, 2015, pp. 341–56; Manuela Moschella and Antje 
Vetterlein, ‘International organizations and organizational fields: explaining policy change in the IMF’, 
European Political Science Review 6: 1, 2014, pp. 143–65.   
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South, such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan in Asia, and Angola, DR Congo, Egypt, 
Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania in Africa. 
 This resurgence in lending coincided with shifts in lending framework. In 2009, the 
much-maligned structural performance criteria (hard conditionality) were abandoned, while 
softer conditionality such as structural benchmarks was retained. More important, in an 
attempt to ‘make the Fund’s support to LICs more flexible and tailored to their increasingly 
diverse needs’,31
 In hindsight, the changes in lending architecture represented only the beginnings of an 
ongoing rethink of the Fund’s role in developing countries. For one, there has been growing 
acknowledgment of the often negative social impact of Fund programmes, leading to the 
‘near universal incorporation of social-spending targets into concessional lending 
arrangements.’
 concessional lending facilities were revamped. The Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF), the Fund’s principal instrument of concessional lending, was 
replaced by a new Extended Credit Facility (ECF), which was modelled after the standard 
instrument towards the MICs, the Stand-By Arrangement (SBA). In addition, two new 
shorter-term concessional facilities were introduced: the Standby Credit Facility (SCF) and 
the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF), the latter with minimal policy conditions. 
32 The purpose is to protect the type of spending deemed crucial for poverty 
reduction (such as health and education spending) from the ill-effects of Fund-led austerity 
programmes. Furthermore, the Fund’s concessional lending capacity was expanded in 2012, 
and a new Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) approach was adopted in 2015, ahead of the 
UN’s Financing for Development summit.33
In the Bank’s case as well, the crisis provided an impetus to step up loans to LICs. 
However, this increase was neither immediate, nor did it initially accompany a change in 
lending instruments. The Bank’s early focus was distinctly on the MICs: between 2007 and 
2010, annual commitments of the IBRD tripled, whereas those of the International 
Development Association (IDA), the organization’s concessional lending arm, increased by 
only a quarter.
 The critical novelty here is the replacement of 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process with an Economic Development 
Document (EDD) that gives borrowers greater leeway in policy goals of Fund programmes. 
Determined to remain a major player in the South, the IMF is seeking to reposition itself and 
maximise its role in poor countries by modifying its operational practice.  
34
 This sense of continuity proved deceptive. Several dynamics have converged in recent 
years to indicate an enhanced Bank focus on LICs. With the replenishment of the IDA’s 
funds in 2010, commitments to LICs rose significantly, topping $20 billion in 2014 and 
overtaking commitments by the IBRD for the first time in recent history.
 Meanwhile, there was continuity in lending instruments, as the Bank’s 
conventional division between investment lending (infrastructure projects) and policy lending 
(often disbursed via the Development Policy Loans, or DPLs) persisted. 
35
                                                 
31 IMF, Handbook of IMF facilities for low-income countries (Washington, DC: IMF: 2016), p.6.  
 Meanwhile, Jim 
Yong Kim’s tenure since 2012 as the Bank’s president turned out to be surprisingly 
transformative. Controversies surrounding internal reorganization aside, a rethinking has 
taken place about the Bank’s role in a changing development space, one outcome of which is 
a more proactive stance on human development and humanitarian emergencies, such as the 
32 Liam Clegg, ‘Social spending targets in IMF concessional lending: US domestic politics and the institutional 
foundations of rapid operational change’, Review of International Political Economy 21: 3, 2014, p. 754.  
33 IMF, Reform of the Fund’s policy on poverty reduction strategies in Fund engagement with low-income 
countries—proposals (Washington, DC: IMF: 2015).  
34 Ali Burak Güven, ‘The IMF, the World Bank, and the global economic crisis: exploring paradigm continuity’, 
Development and Change 43:4, 2012,   p. 876.  
35 World Bank, World Bank annual report (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2015), p. 58.  
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Ebola outbreak.36 Finally, a new lending instrument was introduced in 2012—the Program 
for Results (PforR).37
 The PforR scheme differs from other Bank lending in that it finances member 
governments’ existing programmes, with disbursements made against specific achievement 
indicators. One underlying motive was the global aid effectiveness movement that gained 
significant official support since the mid-2000s,
 
38 favouring results-oriented programmes 
over built-in political incentives of donors. Competition in the South from emerging donors 
as well as new players such as private foundations was another motive. In such an ‘age of 
choice’39 for borrowers, providing flexibility in design and implementation becomes 
crucial.40
 The two-year review of PforR paints it a success story, and calls the Bank’s Board of 
Directors to both remove the existing cap on PforR commitments, thus maximizing 
disbursement, and give staff additional flexibility in implementation, for example with 
regards application of anticorruption guidelines.
 The PforR therefore ticks multiple boxes for the Bank.  
41 This request for increase in commitment 
levels and leniency in principles of implementation42 is understandable given the main source 
of demand for the instrument. As of April 2017, 18 PforR operations were approved in 
Africa, 14 in South Asia, and 11 in the Middle East and North Africa, together accounting for 
over 70 percent of total commitments via the scheme.43
To conclude, over the past decade the twins have adopted a proactive stance to 
preserve their financial presence and thereby policy influence in the poorer regions of the 
South. To that end they have introduced new instruments and sought to render their lending 
architecture more borrower-friendly by displaying adaptability in both their policy 
prescriptions (as in the Fund’s commitment to social spending and the EDD initiative) and 
operational practice (as in Bank efforts to bypass its own anticorruption guidelines).    
 The share of upper-middle income 
countries in PforR has been minimal, with the vast majority of loans targeting LICs and 
lower-middle income members, as proven by substantial demand from countries such as 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, Tanzania and Vietnam. Rapid and smooth 
disbursement of funds is imperative to maintain the Bank’s position as a major lender in such 
contexts where it already encounters competition from new donors and investors.  
  
 
Flexible when necessary: emerging economies as moving targets 
 
 Continuing their operational engagement with large MICs represents a bigger 
challenge for the twins. The threats of evasion and substitution are most tangible in emerging 
                                                 
36 Andrew Rice, ‘The evolution of an idealist’, Foreign Policy 218, May/June 2016, pp. 42–59.  
37 World Bank-Operations Policy and Country Services, A new instrument to advance development 
effectiveness: Program-for-Results financing (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011).  
38 Matthew S. Winters and Shyam Kulkarni, ‘The World Bank in the post-structural adjustment era’, in Manuela 
Moschella and Catherine Weaver, eds, Handbook of global economic governance: players, power and 
paradigms (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 233–48.  
39 Prizzon et al., An age of choice for development finance.  
40 Ben Cormier, ‘Empowered borrowers? Tracking the World Bank’s Program-for-Results’, Third World 
Quarterly 37: 2, 2016, pp. 209–26.   
41 World Bank-Operations Policy and Country Services, Program-for-Results: two-year review (Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2015), p. vi. Compare this to the report of the Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), 
which identifies several areas of weakness; see World Bank-IEG, Program-for-Results: an early stage 
assessment of the process and effects of a new lending instrument (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2016).  
42 Internal response to PforR thus offers a vivid illustration of the ‘disbursement imperative’ in the Bank’s 
operational culture; see Catherine Weaver, ‘The World’s Bank and the Bank’s World’, Global Governance 
13:4, 2007, pp.506ff.  
43 World Bank, ‘Program for Results, chart of operations’, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/ 
261531473875279594/PforR-PDF-of-chart-of-operations-Website.pdf.  
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countries, where enhanced access to private financing and good economic fortunes until 
recently have raised doubts about the value of multilateral borrowing. Given this constraint, 
the IFIs have but little choice to be even more accommodating towards large MICs. Keeping 
emerging countries within the fold requires maximum flexibility. 
 The challenge is most daunting for the Fund, whose business model relies on 
providing emergency financing in exchange for borrower fulfilment of policy conditions. 
This means countries that knock on the IMF’s door should be both desperate for financing 
and willing to forgo policy autonomy. The problem for the IMF is the attitude shift in large 
MICs: an unwillingness to sacrifice policy independence even amidst grim prospects. Cases 
in point are Russia and Turkey during the global crisis, which both resisted IMF financing 
despite being hit hard; Brazil in recent years is another example. In fact, since Turkey’s small 
follow-up SBA in 2005, no large MIC has borrowed from the Fund. One factor here is that, 
thanks to past structural reforms, deeper global financial integration, and beefed up reserves, 
most large economies are no longer as prone to old-style emergencies characterized by acute 
fiscal, balance of payments or currency shocks. They have also developed a higher economic 
pain threshold than before to wilfully sign policy authority over to Fund bureaucrats.  
 The organization has been aware of this constraint, and its main answer has been to 
seek a different engagement with large MICs through a new arrangement, the Flexible Credit 
Line (FCL). Introduced in March 2009, the FCL targets ‘countries with very strong 
fundamentals, policies, and track records of policy implementation.’44
 Some critics of the Fund have praised the FCL as a step in the right direction; it is, 
after all, a mechanism to reward policy prudence rather than bail out irresponsible, reform-
resistant governments.
 On paper, it is 
intended as a precautionary mechanism that offers non-discretionary access to a pot of funds. 
But in practice, the prequalification criteria are so stringent that the FCL is merely a large 
insurance policy bearing the Fund’s seal of approval for the soundness of an economy. The 
mechanism is built on comprehensive ex ante conditionality, meaning applicants must 
demonstrate competence in both core indicators such as a sustainable fiscal position and the 
overall context of economic governance. As such, the FCL’s main function for national 
policymakers is the ability to signal to foreign investors their creditworthiness by flaunting 
ready access to IMF funds. Drawing on it is highly undesirable as it would mean admission 
of major trouble.    
45 Others have applauded it for nudging the Fund towards a more 
genuine ‘lender of last resort’ position in the global economy, its originally intended role.46
The FCL provides clear evidence of the scale of the challenge the Fund faces to keep 
large MICs in its client pool. At first glance, it is the ultimate tailoring of the organization’s 
lending architecture to the growing client aversion to conventional facilities. However, by 
continuing to place the Fund on a pedestal of policy expertise and approval without 
addressing ‘issues of stigma’
 
Nevertheless, demand for the arrangement has been modest, to say the least. Only Colombia, 
Mexico, and Poland signed up for it, all within two months of its introduction. They also all 
remain on a rolling arrangement, having renewed their status multiple times. Mexico is by far 
the most heavily insured; its latest arrangement of SDR62 billion has taken total Fund 
commitments to the country to well over SDR200 billion. 
47
                                                 
44 ‘IMF implements major policy lending improvements’, IMF Press Release, No. 09/85, 
 for borrowers, it reproduces an institutionalised hierarchy 
http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr0985.htm. 
45 Allen H. Meltzer, ‘The IMF returns’, Review of International Organizations  6:3/4, 2011, pp. 443–52.  
46 Jari John and Tobias Knedlik, ‘New IMF lending facilities and financial stability in emerging countries’, 
Economic Analysis and Policy 41: 2, 2011, pp. 225–38.  
47 Carmen M. Reinhart and Christoph Trebesch, ‘The International Monetary Fund: 70 years of reinvention’, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 30: 1, 2016, p. 24.  
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emerging powers often find toxic. No wonder then that Brazil and Indonesia announced their 
lack of interest in the new facility within months of its introduction. In the years that 
followed, strong recovery in most MICs amidst continued controversy over governance 
reforms at the institution left no appetite to endure even trace amounts of Fund influence. 
 The Bank’s experience with large MICs has been nearly the polar opposite. Not only 
has it retained emerging countries as active clients but it has managed to do so without major 
adjustments to its lending architecture. A small group of large developing countries 
(comprising Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey) have 
consistently remained amongst the Bank’s biggest clients for the past four decades, accessing 
resources through conventional channels of project and policy lending (and, with the quite 
recent exception of India,  not so much via the new PforR). In 2009-15, total commitments to 
these countries exceeded $100 billion, comprising more than a third of all Bank lending.48
 Lending heavily to these members is excellent business for the Bank: it contributes 
handsomely to the IBRD’s bottom line; it helps maintain policy foothold in systemically 
significant countries; and it offers a familiar environment where it can operate with relative 
ease and confidence. The Bank’s enthusiasm is evident in its 2014 decision to raise its Single 
Borrower Limit by US$2.5 billion each for Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and Mexico.
 
49
The motives of emerging countries in continuing to borrow from the Bank are more 
complex. One incentive is cost. Despite improved opportunities for private financing, 
multilateral development banks still offer more competitive rates and better terms. Technical 
assistance is also a potential factor. The Bank offers a wide array technical expertise, which 
could entice countries that are otherwise unlikely to be attracted by price considerations 
alone, which was often suggested at the main motive behind Chinese borrowing.
 
50
Perhaps the most important factor is the built-in flexibility that the organization 
provides in comparison to the IMF. The Bank has at its disposal a stupendous array of policy 
instruments, which can be deployed liberally to accommodate borrower preferences without 
strict adherence to a restrictive set of normative priorities, especially when countries are 
unburdened with concurrent IMF programmes. As a result, large MICs, as valuable clients 
free from IMF constraint over the past decade, have been able to draw on the organization’s 
vast repertoire with minimal policy compromise. In China, India and Turkey, for example, 
the emphasis has been on physical and market infrastructure, whereas intrusive policy 
lending that targets governance items has been marginalised. By contrast, in Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico, loans have reflected growing regional sensibilities of social sustainability, 
and prioritised human development and social protection, often supporting existing 
programmes such as Oportunidades and Bolsa Familia.
 An active 
loan portfolio would include demonstration projects and considerable knowledge transfer, 
assuring unbroken access to the organization’s analytical and advisory activities (AAA). 
51
This brief discussion highlights the importance of differences in mandate and 
organization for the twins’ ability to appeal to different clients. What the Bank manages to 
accomplish rather effortlessly, the Fund cannot despite bold institutional innovation. Still, 
 In short, countries have been able 
to tap Bank funds selectively and in accordance with their domestic preferences, which 
permits borrower-driven realignments of the Bank’s operational focus on the ground.    
                                                 
48 Güven, ‘The World Bank and emerging powers.’ 
49 ‘World Bank President sees $100 billion increase in lending ability to help end poverty’, World Bank Press 
Release, 01 April 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/04/01/world-president-100-
billion-increase-lending-poverty. 
50 Pieter Bottelier, ‘China and the World Bank: how a partnership was built’, Stanford Center for International 
Development, Working Paper No. 277, 2007.    
51 Güven, ‘The World Bank and emerging powers.’ 
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both organizations display will and capacity to adapt to an evolving context of MIC demand 
for multilateral lending.          
Reinforce and refine: sustaining authority via non-lending activities 
 
 Although lending remains a defining activity for the Bretton Woods twins, their non-
financial functions also present them with opportunities to reinforce their status as leading 
international organizations. An obvious strength is the role they play in inter-organizational 
cooperation. Both the Fund and Bank are members of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as 
part of an exclusive club of international bodies that also includes the OECD, the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), and the European Central Bank (ECB). They were also 
members of the UN System Task Team that set the post-2015 Development Agenda and 
formulated the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The scale of their organizational 
reach and transnational policy influence via such platforms can be neither directly 
undermined by rising powers nor easily matched by new rival organizations.       
 Some of this reach and influence stem from distinct non-lending functions. For the 
Fund, surveillance is arguably the most visible such function. Multilateral as well as bilateral 
oversight is indeed the principal mandate of the Fund, which it bequeathed from the League 
of Nations.52 To this end it has various instruments at its disposal, from Article IV 
Consultations and Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAP) at the national level to 
various periodic reports at regional and global levels such as the World Economic Outlook, 
and setting standards for data dissemination across its membership, which together amplify 
the organization’s policy leverage and normative influence.53 Yet the rapid contagion of the 
global crisis exposed weaknesses in the organization’s capacity to fulfil this function, 
triggering an institutional overhaul, including staff composition of FSAPs.54
 A related area is economic policy norms. A combination of shrinking clientele and the 
apparent success of experimentation in some rising economies had curtailed the Fund’s 
normative clout by the mid-2000s. The surge in lending after the crisis along with its role in 
the FSB revived the organization’s leverage, inspiring a vibrant scholarship on its evolving 
normative proclivities. One major theme in this literature is fiscal policy, in particular, the 
IMF’s varied position on fiscal austerity versus countercyclical policy.
 A significant 
change was the adoption in 2012 of a new Financial Surveillance Strategy, which, among 
other things, aimed to integrate bilateral and multilateral surveillance (IMF 2012). More 
crucially, the crisis underlined the Fund’s authority as a major international standard-setting 
body and consolidated its distinctive place among other platforms of global governance. 
These functions of the IMF are largely immune to the rise of new powers. 
55 Another concerns 
financial regulations and especially the organization’s increasingly receptive attitude towards 
capital controls.56 But while it is tempting to envision the Fund as more open-minded than 
before,57
                                                 
52 Louis Pauly, Who elected the bankers? Surveillance and control in the world economy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997).  
 some of this flexibility may not resonate as strongly on the ground. In fact recent 
53 Domenico Lombardi and Ngaire Woods, ‘The politics of influence: an analysis of IMF surveillance’, Review 
of International Political Economy 15: 5, 2008, pp. 711–39.  
54 Manuela Moschella, ‘IMF surveillance in crisis: the past, present, and future of the reform process’, Global 
Society 26: 1, 2012, pp. 43–60; Leonard Seabrooke and Emelie Nillson, Professional skills in international 
financial surveillance: assessing change in IMF policy teams’, Governance 28: 2, 2015,  pp. 237–54.  
55 Cornel Ban, ‘Austerity versus stimulus? Understanding fiscal policy change at the International Monetary 
Fund since the Great Recession’, Governance 28: 2, 2015, 167–83.  
56 Jeffrey Chwieroth, ‘Controlling capital: the International Monetary Fund and transformative incremental 
change from within international organisations’, New Political Economy 19: 3, 2014, pp. 445–69; Manuela 
Moschella, ‘The institutional roots of incremental ideational change: the IMF and capital controls after the 
global financial crisis’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 17: 3, 2015, pp. 442–60. 
57 Jonathan D. Ostry, Prakash Loungani and Davide Furceri, ‘Neoliberalism: oversold?’, Finance & 
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research finds continuity in the Fund’s policy conditionalities over the past three decades.58
 The Bank’s position is similar. Its research department (the Development Economics 
Vice-Presidency) and its ‘capacity building’ arm (the World Bank Institute) have long carried 
considerable weight in the creation and dissemination of development policy norms, in a way 
that typically privileged paradigms ascendant in the Anglo-American core.
          
59 Building on this 
strength, from the mid-1990s onwards the organization has cast itself as a ‘knowledge bank’ 
at the forefront of efforts to diagnose and treat development problems.60 However, in its 
undertakings the Bank would be continually encumbered with ‘economisation, quantification 
and blueprint approaches.’61 As with the Fund, it also suffers from a structural gap between 
rhetoric and policy reality on the ground.62
 What distinguishes the Bank from its twin is the scale of expertise at its disposal and 
the wide-ranging role this expertise plays in its operations. It would not be an exaggeration to 
portray the Bank as an ecosystem of multiple ‘epistemic communities.’ As the world’s largest 
development bank involved in hundreds of complex projects at any time, the Bank employs 
not only thousands of economists, but also scores of sectoral and area specialists from 
agriculture to education, energy, environment, health, public governance, and trade. It is 
through this pool of experts that the Bank provides significant technical assistance (TA) to 
member governments as part of its lending operations. This has traditionally been an 
important attraction for large MICs such as China that are interested in demonstration 
projects. In turn disseminating policy lessons from high performers to the rest of the clientele 
is often cited as an important motive for the organization to engage the MICs.
   
63
The Bank actively seeks to maximize the gains from its expertise. The distinct 
specialisms at its disposal formed the basis of a controversial restructuring in 2013–4, which 
introduced fourteen Global Practices to bring together experts who share the same specialism 
but were previously assigned to different regional directorships.
 
64 Restructuring the Bank 
based on expertise rather than geography was presented as one way of improving its efficacy. 
This pool of expertise also allows the organization to reach out to countries that are otherwise 
uninterested in Bank loans. Reimbursable Advisory Services (RAS) is the mechanism in 
place since the 1970s to this end, offering countries customised technical assistance for a fee. 
In Europe and Central Asia, for example, RAS programmes have recently found clients 
amongst not only existing borrowers such as Albania and Kazakhstan but also high-income 
economies including Czech Republic and Italy.65
                                                                                                                                                        
Development 52: 2,  2016, pp. 38–41.  
 While income from these programmes is 
58 Alexander E. Kentikelenis, Thomas H. Stubbs, and Lawrence P. King, ‘IMF conditionality and development 
policy space, 1985–2014’, Review of International Political Economy 23: 4, 2016, pp. 543–82.   
59 Kate Bayliss, Ben Fine, and Elisa Van Waeyenberge, eds, The political economy of development: the World 
Bank, neoliberalism and development research (London: Pluto, 2011); Robin Broad, ‘Research, knowledge, and 
the art of “paradigm maintenance”: The World Bank’s Development Economics Vice-Presidency (DEC)’, 
Review of International Political Economy 13: 3, 2006, 387–419. See Adrian Bazbauers, ‘The World Bank as 
development teacher’, Global Governance 22: 3, 2016, pp. 409–26, on the centrality of the Bank’s ‘training 
programs’ for norm dissemination and socialization.  
60 Liam Clegg, ‘Our dream is a world full of poverty indicators: the US, the World Bank, and the power of 
numbers’, New Political Economy 15: 4, 2010, pp. 473–92; Teresa Kramarz and Bessma Momani, ‘The World 
Bank as knowledge bank: analyzing the limits of a legitimate global knowledge actor’, Review of Policy 
Research 30: 4, 2013, pp. 409–31.  
61 Antje Vetterlein, ‘Seeing like the World Bank on poverty’, New Political Economy 17: 1, 2012, p. 54. 
62 Weaver, The Hypocrisy Trap. 
63 Gregory Chin, ‘The World Bank and China: the long decade of realignment’, in Carla P. Freeman, ed., 
Handbook on China and developing countries (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016), pp. 172ff.  
64 ‘Restructuring hell at the World Bank’, Financial Times, 9 April 2014.  
65 World Bank, Reimbursable advisory services in Europe and Central Asia (ECA) (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 2014).  
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limited, they underline the uniqueness of the Bank in terms of both the scope of its expertise 
and the ways in which this expertise can be deployed. 
Reinforcement of authority through non-lending activity is the least purposeful of the 
coping mechanisms outlined in this paper. The twins do not bolster their research activities, 
carry out surveillance functions, cooperate with other organizations or deploy their expertise 
to counter the already diffuse and unquantifiable normative influence of rising countries. It is 
thus more appropriate to view this coping mechanism as an unintended consequence of the 
organizations continuing their pre-existing activities with seemingly innocuous adaptations, 
which nonetheless might yield a generic defence against the normative challenges they face. 
 
 
Dispensing development policy as ‘the rest’ rises 
 
In an increasingly multipolar world, the IMF and the World Bank face severe 
challenges to their authority and viability, but they also employ mechanisms to navigate these 
challenges, and defend their position as elite players in the global institutional landscape. The 
twins’ resilience stems in part from their non-lending activities, the refinements to which help 
reinforce normative and policy authority. But the organizations have also openly or discreetly 
modified their lending framework and patterns to sustain their operational viability. 
While the refinements and modifications outlined above display too wide a range to 
proceed from a single causal factor or mechanism, the findings are not without implication 
for theories of international organizational behaviour and for the specialist literature on the 
IFIs. Some changes, as in the Fund’s incorporation of social spending targets, are linked to 
shareholder initiatives,66 while others, as in the organization’s more receptive attitude 
towards capital controls, reveal an incremental path including external and internal forces.67
More important for the aims of this paper are the practical implications of the twins’ 
adaptive efforts. One key question is whether these efforts sufficiently address the distinct 
challenges of growing multipolarity. This does not appear to be the case, for three reasons. 
First, there is the continued weight of conditionality. To be fair, most adjustments to the 
lending framework, from the FCL and EDD to flexible Bank lending to large MICs, extend 
borrowers more voice than before. Yet to provide effective remedies to operational and 
competitive challenges, a more explicit step away from conditionality is needed. To the 
contrary, IFI practice remains inextricably wedded to the hierarchical business model of 
conditional lending—a model deeply unpalatable to developing countries. 
 
Yet at first glance most adaptive efforts rest on a different dynamic, that is, internally-devised 
responses to the systemic and at times rapid shifts in the operational environment. This 
applies to the Fund’s extensive overhaul of its lending framework during the height of the 
global crisis including the creation of the FCL, and its subsequent adoption of EDD, and to 
the Bank’s new PforR as well as its enhanced flexibility towards large MICs. In exploring the 
origins of these adaptations, therefore, future research would benefit from methodically 
combining constructivist insights on intra-organizational factors with recent work on 
structural external determinants of IFI practice. 
Second, the viability of new measures is uneven and their value often unknown. On 
the operational front, the FCL has mostly been a disappointment, while on the competitive 
side the Bank’s PforR and ad hoc flexibility towards MICs is a poor match for China’s 
recently increased strategic appetite (not only the AIIB’s rapidly growing loan portfolio but 
also the ambitious Belt and Road initiative). Meanwhile old instruments, such as the Fund’s 
extended arrangements and the Bank’s DPLs, still receive respectable demand. 
                                                 
66 Clegg, ‘Social spending targets in IMF concessional lending.’ 
67 Chwieroth, ‘Controlling capital’; Moschella, ‘The institutional roots of incremental ideational change.’  
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Third, it is uncertain whether these adjustments have improved the efficacy of either 
organization beyond enabling them to muddle through a tough juncture. Even by the 
standards of their mainstream critics, the initiatives examined only tangentially address the 
twins’ chronic problems.68
A clearer implication of the findings concerns the perceptions and practice of North-
South development cooperation. What is lacking from the adaptive efforts examined here is 
not only a cohesive strategy, but also a paradigmatically distinct reorientation. From the 
Fund’s moderated attitude towards capital controls to the Bank’s reluctance to uphold its own 
safeguards in its PforR scheme, there is a move away from standardization across clientele, 
and towards greater selectivity in the application of existing policy repertoire. Steady 
diversification of lending instruments and sustained emphasis on ‘partnerships’ also expand 
discretionary possibilities. As a result, especially on the ground if not always in official 
reports, both organizations are less rigid about what development refers to as ‘policy 
practice.’ The sort of normative certitude and prescriptive eagerness that characterized Fund 
and Bank programmes in the final quarter of the last century appears to have languished.  
 The Fund’s surveillance reforms and the Bank’s expertise-based 
internal restructuring, for example, can both be construed as partly aiming to maximize pre-
existing authority, but it is difficult to judge how much of an improvement they represent. 
Consequently, while the twins’ efforts to adapt to their dynamics environs offer a useful 
counterpoint to the overly pessimistic projections about their fortunes, on balance they 
represent only modest deviations from existing practice and do not amount to a cohesive, 
interlocking new strategy. Their effectiveness in addressing the challenges of multipolarity is 
thus highly variable, comprising a mix of modest gain, abject failure, and untested promise.   
This point is consistent with recent observations of a significant transformation taking 
place in international development. Some consider it a transitory stage, with overlapping 
dynamics that span development thinking, donor priorities, and the overall landscape of 
development assistance.69 Others argue we have entered an age in which rules, resources and 
norms in the development regime are only ‘loosely coupled’ and authority increasingly 
decentralized.70 Another identifier is ‘pliable neoliberalism’ with increased elasticity on the 
part of platforms of global economic governance such as the Bretton Woods institutions.71
Can this openness and diversity catalyze a fresh institutionalized settlement in 
international development? Only if there are additional new dynamics to also undermine the 
political-economic background of rising multipolarity and deficient multilateralism, such as a 
long overdue economic implosion in China that might create financing needs of a different 
order, or transformative political jolts in the North to overturn intensified scepticism towards 
formal mechanisms of global economic coordination. But if recent trends of sluggish yet 
steady growth in many emerging economies and populist-conservative aversion to 
multilateralism in leading advanced polities persist, the possibility of a proper new settlement 
is slim at best. The sort of ad hoc adaptation and muddling through evidenced in this paper 
will then remain the dominant scenario until a genuine threshold is reached.     
 
Normative openness and diversity in practice are common threads in all such observations. 
                                                 
68 See, for example, Barry Eichengreen and Ngaire Woods, ‘The IMF’s unmet challenges’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 30: 1, 2016, pp. 29–52; Kahler, ‘The global economic multilaterals’; Ravallion, ‘The World Bank’.  
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